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The Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Revised Statutes, and Louisiana
jurisprudence must be considered in any question involving lease financing. This
article addresses the leasing of immovable property' including: the rights of the
creditors of lessors who obtain a mortgage on the underlying property, a security
interest in the rental stream, or a security interest in the lessor's fixtures; the
rights of creditors of lessees who obtain a mortgage on the lessee's lease or on
the lessee's right of occupancy and possession, as well as creditors who obtain
a security interest in the lessee's movable property; the lessor's privilege on
movables found on the leased premises and the ranking ofthis right against other
legal privileges and security interests; and certain related topics.2
I. THE NATURE OF A LEASE
Lease is a contract or, in strictly civilian terminology, a conventional
obligation. As in any conventional obligation, the parties must have the capacity
to contract,3 there must be consent by both parties,4 and the contract must be
supported by a lawful cause.' Lawyers trained in the common law tend to
equate civilian "cause" with common law "consideration." The two are not the
same. "Cause" is a far broader concept and encompasses the "reason why" a
party enters into an obligation.6 Thus, it is not limited to contemporaneous
consideration."'
In Louisiana, lease is a "nominate contract";s that is, it is subject to special
rules in addition to the general ones that apply to all contracts. These special
rules are found in three separate locations: in a section of the Louisiana Civil
Code entitled "Of Lease"; 9 in provisions of the Civil Code dealing with legal
privileges; and in the Louisiana Civil Code ancillaries." The vast majority
of the Civil Code provisions are unchanged since 1870, and these provisions, in
large part, are substantially identical to the Civil Code of 1825. Thus, most of

1.
2.

Lease financing involving movable property is beyond the scope of this article.
The tax implications of lease financing are beyond the scope of this article.

3.
4.
5.
6.

La.
La.
La.
La.

Civ.
Civ.
Civ.
Civ.

Code
Code
Code
Code

arts. 1918-1926.
arts. 1927-1947.
art. 1966.
art. 1967.

7. For a detailed analysis of the meaning of "cause," see Saul Litvinoff, Still Another Look
at Cause, 48 La. L. Rev. 3 (1987); Saul Litvinoff, Obligations, § 196 et seq. ct 381 (1969).
8. La. Civ. Code arts. 1915-1916.
9. La. Civ. Code tit. IX arts. 2668-2777.
10. La. Civ. Code arts. 3217(3), 3218-3219, 3256-3260.
11. La. R.S. 9:2721.1 (Supp. 1999), 3201-3260 (1997), 4401 (1997), 4770 (1991 and Supp.
1999). The laws contained in Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S. 9:51 ct seq.) are
inextricably linked with the Louisiana Civil Code. In the words of the Louisiana Law Institute's

original Reporter for the Project to Title 9, "As indicated by the word Ancillaries, Title 9 of the
Revised Statutes of 1950 is auxiliary to the Civil Code of Louisiana." Harriet S. Daggett,
Introductory Comments to Title 9, West's LSA Revised Statutes, Vol 3, Civil Code Ancillaries, at
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the substantive provisions of the lease articles in the Civil Code have been
unchanged for over 150 years, although the lease provisions in the Civil Code
ancillaries have been updated on a regular basis.
for a valid
The Civil Code lists three "absolutely necessary" requirements
2
consent."'
the
and
price,
the
thing,
"the
contract of lease:
The "thing" is the property being leased. While Louisiana law requires strict
descriptions of immovable property when a sale or mortgage is involved, even
as between the parties, 3 the requirements involving leases are less stringent.
The rule that emerges from the cases is that ifthe parties to the lease know what
property is included, and if the issue involves only the parties, a broad
description will suffice."
The "price" is the amount of rent. If the lease agreement is silent on the
rent, then the lease is invalid. 5 Although rent must be agreed upon between
the lessor and the lessee for there to be a valid lease, it is not essential that rent
be fixed at a specific sum of money per week, month or year. Rather, rent is
sufficiently certain as long as it can be readily ascertained or can be calculated
6
from facts or circumstances not within the control of the lessor and lessee.'
contain
Thus, rent can be based upon a percentage of the lessee's sales or may
escalator provisions based upon an index rate.
A crucial part of the parties' consent is an agreement upon the term of the
lease. Louisiana law does not have any specific provisions on how long a lease
may last, and it is not unusual to find recorded documents, particularly dealing

12.

La. Civ. Code art. 2670.

13. See, e.g., in the sales provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Law Institute's
Official Revision Comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code article 2440, amended by 1993 La. Acts
No.841, section 1, which requires a "description of immovable property" that is precise. The
Revision Comment relies upon Hargrovev. Hodge,9 La. App. 434, 121 So. 224 (2d Cir. 1928),
reh'grefused, writ refused, No. 3281 (Jan. 28, 1929), which noted that "the general rule is that the
description must fully appear within the four comers of the instrument itself, or that the deed should
refer to some map, plat, or deed as part of the description, so that the same may be clear." rd. at
436, 121 So. At 225.
Also see Louisiana Civil Code article 3288, requiring that a "contract of mortgage must state
precisely the nature and situation of each of the immovables or other property over which it is
granted .... " For more on mortgage property descriptions, see Michael H. Rubin and Stephen P.
Strohschein, Security Devices, 55 La. L Rev. 611, 618-19 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. James, 188 La. 884, 178 So. 384 (La. 1938) (lease of "Lot 2, Block
410" sufficed to lease Lot 2 of Block 192 when the parties knew what was intended and the
remainder of the description showed their intent); Wood v. Sala Y Fabrigas, 105 La. 1, 29 So. 367
(La. 1900) (lease of"Zeringue's Landing under Nine-Mile Poinf' was sufficiently descriptive of the
property); Arata v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition Dist., 254 La. 579,225 So. 2d 362 (La. 1969),
reh "gdenied, cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 569, 396 U.S. 279 (1970) (ability of lessor to substitute other
land did not make property description of the thing leased invalid).
15. Groghan v. Billingsley, 313 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), reh g denied,writ denied,
318 So. 2d 46 and 48 (1975); and Mouton v. P. A. B., Inc., 450 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984),
reh'g dented, writ denied,458 So. 2d 118 (1984).
16. Arata v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition Dist., 254 La. 579,225 So. 2d 362 (La. 1969),
reh'gdenied cert. denied,90 S. Ct. 569, 396 U.S. 279 (1970).
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with timber lands, that provide a term of 99 years.' 7 Cautious practitioners are
careful in delineating the length of a lease, however, for Louisiana jurisprudence
is clear that perpetual leases violate public policy and are therefore void. 8
The failure to set forth explicitly a term of the lease is not fatal. Louisiana
law provides that if no duration of the lease has been established by the parties,
then for houses, apartments, and other "edifice(s)" (which presumably would
include commercial establishments) the "lease shall be considered to have been
made by the month."' 9 In this situation, the lease may be terminated in writing
by either party giving written notice to the other "at least ten days before the
expiration of the month, which has begun to run."2 If what is being leased is
a farm or predial estate, the presumption changes from a lease on a monthly
basis to one by the year.2'

H. A LEASE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE INWRITING AND DOES NOT HAVE TO
BE RECORDED, BUT

IT IS ADVISABLE TO DO SO

As between the parties, there is no requirement that the lease be in writing.
An oral lease is just as valid as a written lease, and the parties may enforce it
against one another.'
The ability of the parties to enforce a lease between themselves is of little
help, however, to a creditor who wishes to take a security interest in some aspect
ofthe lessor's or lessee's rights. Lease financing depends upon the assurance of
the lender that the security interest will be recognized and enforceable against the
world; this requires that the lease itself be effective as to third parties.
To be effective against third parties, a lease must be in writing and must be
recorded in the conveyance records of the parish where the immovable property
is located.'
There is no requirement that a written lease be witnessed or
notarized for it to be valid; however, if the lease is in authentic form (signed
before a Notary Public in the presence of two witnesses),2 4 then it is self-

17. E.g. IP Timberlands Operating Co., Ltd. v. Denmiss Corp., 657 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), reh g denied,writ denied, 661 So. 2d 1348 (1995).
18. Id.

19. La. Civ. Code art. 2685.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 2686, amended by 1924 La. Acts 1924 No. 9, § 1.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 2687. See also Management One of La., Inc. v. Thibodeaux, 598 So.
2d 1224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); and D'Antonio v. Simone, 653 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1995).
22. La. Civ. Code art. 2683; cf.Comb v. Dugas, 576 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
23. Fo-Coin Co. v. Dnury, 349 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied;La. R.S.
9:2721 (1991 and Supp. 1999), amendedby 1992 La. Acts No. 974, § 1. It is beyond the scope of
this article to deal with the intricacies of "filing" versus "recordation."

Suffice it to note that,

historically, in Louisiana conveyances were effective upon filing even if never recorded. Schneidau
v. New Orleans Land Co., 132 La. 264, 61 So. 225 (1913), on rehg. For more on the distinction
between filing and recordation, see Rubin and Strohschein, supranote 13, at 614-15.
24. La. Civ. Code art. 1833.
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proving and no extrinsic evidence is required on the identity of the parties who
signed the lease.
Louisiana's Public Record Doctrine, now enshrined in Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:2721, provides that no lease or other interest affecting immovable
property
shall be binding on or affect third persons or third parties unless and
until filed for registry in the office of the parish recorder of the parish
where the land or immovable is situated. Neither secret claims or
equities nor other matters outside the public records shall be binding on
or affect such third parties."
The term "third person" is defined in the Civil Code and excludes the parties to
a contract26as well as the notary; however, witnesses to the document are "third
persons.,
Despite loose language in some cases that the Louisiana public records
provide "constructive notice" to third persons,27 in fact the Public Records
Doctrine is one of absence 2 --that is, if a document is never part of the public
records, then third parties may ignore it, even if they have actual knowledge of
its existence.29 The converse is also true; if a document is properly filed for
3
registry but never indexed,30 or if it has been filed and fraudulently canceled,
it nonetheless affects third persons.
There are special provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code ancillaries dealing
with leases. In 1986, the Louisiana legislature enacted a provision allowing an
32
extract of a lease to be recorded rather than the entire lease. Of course, this
provision will apply only if the original lease is in writing. If the parties intend
to record an extract of lease, then five requirements must be met. The extract,
at a minimum, must contain: the names and the signatures ofboth the lessor and
lessee, the "date of execution of the lease," "a brief description of the leased
property," the "term of the lease," and a reference to any renewal or purchase

25. La. RKS. 9:2721 (1991 and Supp. 1999).
26. La. Civ. Code arts. 3309-3310.
27. Brown v. Johnson, I1 So. 713 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Judice-Henry-Mary Agency, Inc.
v. Franklin, 376 So. 2d 991 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979), writdenied,381 So. 2d 508 (1980); Hasslocher
v. Pecknagel, 160 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 2d Cir.), reh'gdenied, writ denied,245 La. 964, 162 So.
2d 14 (1964).
28. "Therefore a third person can rely upon absence from the records (non-recordation)as
guaranteeing ineffectiveness of an instrument required to be recorded." Gulf S. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Demarest, 354 So. 2d 695, 697 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
29. "This Court has held uniformly, in the interest of security and certainty of titles, that the
records kept by law are conclusive and knowledge acquired dehors the public records is immaterial."
Southern Casualty Co. v. Ross, 179 La. 145, 149, 153 So. 673, 674 (La. 1934).

30. Progressive Bank & Trust Co. v. Dieco Speciality Co., Inc., 42 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1982).
31. Gulf South Bank & Trust Co., 354 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
32. La. R.S. 9:2721.1 (Supp. 1999), added by 1986 La. Acts No. 1053, § 1.
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options contained in the lease. The Louisiana Legislature emphasized the
significance of filing extracts of leases by making the 1986 statute remedial and
retroactive. It explicitly applies to any pre-1986 extract that is in "substantial
compliance with the provisions of this Section and such instrument shall affect
third persons and third parties as of the date of recordation."33
Lenders who rely upon any aspect of a lease as security will want to assure
that not only is the lease (or an extract of lease) properly and timely filed, but
34
also that any renewal also is filed. In Avenue Plaza,L.L. C. v. Falgoust,
the

court held that an unrecorded renewal of lease was not binding on the third-party
purchaser of the leased property, and the third-party purchaser could rely on the
absence of the unrecorded renewal.
Even the actual knowledge of a purchaser that an unrecorded lease burdens
the immovable property being acquired is not sufficient to support a conclusion
that the purchaser intended to purchase the property subject to the lease. The
lease of property does not affect the purchaser or follow the immovable property
into the purchaser's hand if the lessee has failed to record the lease or if it
cannot be shown that the purchaser intended that the purchase would be subject
to the lease.3" When the purchaser assumes an unrecorded lease in the act of
sale, however, the purchaser is bound to recognize the lessee's right.36
Likewise, if a purchaser expressly assumes the lease obligation of its vendor and
acknowledges this assumption by means of' an assignment of the lease to its
lender, the purchaser cannot contest the validity of the lease." These rules are
understandable, for one who assumes an obligation becomes a party to it; thus,
the act of assumption vitiates a claim of third party status."
Parties who record extracts of leases should be careful to make sure that the
extract is accurate. Likewise, they should avoid "counter letters," the creation
of documents not intended to be filed but which state a purpose or agreement
that is at odds with the recorded instrument,39 for there is a Louisiana criminal
statute .that makes it a crime to file with public officials "any document
containing a false statement or false representation of a material fact."40 The
existence of a counter letter may be the basis of a claim that the recorded
document contains a false representation of a material fact.

33. La. R.S. 9:2721.1(B) (Supp. 1999).
34. 654 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 657 So. 2d 1040 (1995).
35. Knowles v. Wholesale Elec. Supply ofShreveport, Inc., 388 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1980), reh'gdenied.
36. Canco, Inc. v. Outdoor Sys., Adver., 681 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
37. Motwani v. Fun Centers, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
38. See, eg., the distinction between the rights of persons who acquire property and assume
indebtedness versus the rights of those who acquire property subject to indebtedness. La. Code Civ.
P. arts. 2702, 2703.
39. A discussion of counter letters can be found in Dawsey v. Gruber,647 So. 2d 1084 (La.
1994).
40. La. R.S. 14:133 (Supp. 1999), amended by 1992 La. Acts No. 539, § 1.
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Im. A MORTGAGE ON THE LESSOR'S PROPERTY

The lessor, as owner of the land, may mortgage the land itself. A mortgage,
under Louisiana law, is an "indivisible real right that burdens the entirety of the
mortgaged property .... ."" The mortgage encumbers not merely the land but
also the component parts of the land;42 "component parts" include buildings and
other constructions4 as well as things that are permanently attached to a
building or construction "such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical, or other
installations .... ,", Louisiana law allows an owner to make certain items of
movable property that are not fixtures into immovable property merely by filing
in the conveyance records of the parish a declaration making machinery and
appliances in commercial establishments "component parts"; this declaration is
effective to legally immobilize these items even if they can be easily removed
physically.4 Unlike a lease, which may be oral, a mortgage must be in writing
to be valid even as between the parties.4" Also, unlike a lease which needs to
be signed by both the lessor and lessee, a mortgage need be signed only by the
mortgagor; the mortgagee's consent is presumed.4
The fact that a lessor has granted a mortgage does not necessarily imply the
personal liability of the lessor; a mortgage may secure a "non-recourse" or "in
rein" obligation ' or may secure the personal obligation of another.4 9
It is not unusual for lessors to enter into a long term lease of unimproved
property. The contract of lease typically provides that, at the termination of the
lease, the building (even if owned by the lessee during the lease as a separate
"other construction") reverts in ownership to the lessor. To finance such
construction, lenders typically require not only that the tenant fully secure the
loan, but also that the landlord mortgage the lessor's interest in the real estate. An
example of this arrangement canbe found in Kavanuagh v. Berkett.5" There, the
court found that a requirement in a lease providing for an in rem mortgage against
the lessor's property contemplated a commercially reasonable mortgage."' In

41.
42.

La. Civ. Code art. 3280.
La. Civ. Code art. 3286.

43.
44.

La. Civ. Code art. 465.
La. Civ. Code art. 466.

45.
46.

La. Civ. Code art. 467.
La. Civ. Code art. 3287.

47. La. Civ. Code art. 3289.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 3297.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 3295.
50. 407 So. 2d 645 (La. 1981).
51. The language of the document provided, in part:
(A) LESSEE shall not place any mortgage, lien, privilege, or encumbrance on or against
the leased property or permit any of its creditors to do so without LESSOR's prior written
consent
(3) Upon request and during the primary term (first twenty years) of this lease, LESSOR
agrees to permit LESSEE to mortgage the leased property or a portion thereof for the
purpose of providing initial interim or initial permanent financing of the cost ofphysical

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 59

Kavanaugh, a commercial transaction, the court held that the parties must have
contemplated a commercially reasonable mortgage that would include the rights
of the lessor's mortgagee to obtain Louisiana executory process and to require
other standard provisions concerning waivers of certain notices. Because of this
case, tenants who are negotiating for long-term ground leases where the landlord
will be giving an in rem mortgage on the underlying property often negotiate a
clause in the lease requiring the landlord to grant a "commercially reasonable in
rem mortgage against the landlord's ownership interest in the land."
Although the mortgage against the lessor's property will encumber all
component parts, the definition ofwhat constitutes a component part remains the
subject of litigation. For example, a chandelier in an expensive home has been
2
deemed a "component part" even though it could be easily removed and a
transformer containing PCBs has been held to be a component part of a commercial building.53 In cases decided in the last few years, a limestone working base
in a limestone pit was held to be a component part although the loose limestone
in the pit was not, 4 while a drilling rig skidded on top of and welded to a
5
platform in the Gulf of Mexico was held not to be a component part." A
lender who wants to make sure to obtain all fixtures and component parts on the
property will be well advised to do three things: first, take a mortgage on the
tenant's right of occupancy and improvements; second, take a mortgage on the
lessor's interest in the land and component parts; and third, timely file a "fixture
5
filing" under Louisiana's version of Article*9 of the U.C.C. " Under Louisiana
law, lenders may not obtain a valid fixture filing if the property is residential;
the property must be retail or commercial and the filing must be accomplished
before the fixture is attached.
IV. A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE RENTAL STREAM
In addition to mortgaging the rights in the land, a lessor also may
encumber the rental income stream of the property. Louisiana has a
lengthy statute-Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4401-hat details how lenders are
to create and perfect this security interest. It should be noted that perfection
occurs only under this statute; there is no way to use Louisiana's version of

improvements placed or to be placed on the property covered by the mortgage, provided
the LESSEE first satisfies the following terms and conditions:
1-The mortgage shall involve and shall require no personal ordirect obligation on the part
of the LESSOR and shall bear only against LESSOR's land and more specifically, against
that portion of the leased property specifically mortgaged.
407 So. 2d at 648-49 n.l.
52. See Equibank v. U.S. I.R.S., 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985).
53. See U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Public Sery., Inc., 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987).
54. See Bayou Fleet Partnership v. Dravo Basic Materials, Inc., 106 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997).
55. See Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909 (5th Cir. 1997).
56. La. R.S. 10:9-313 (1993), added by 1988 La. Acts No. 528, § 1.
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U.C.C. article 917 to perfect the security interest in rents, for Article 9 does not
apply to interests in immovable property.55
Originally, the statute (Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4401) provided that the
document creating the security interest in the lessor's rental income had to be
recorded in the parish conveyance rather than in the mortgage records. This
requirement was a trap for the unwary, and there were instances where a
mortgagee recorded a separate act of rental assignment in the mortgage records
only to find that, while the document was effective between the parties even
without recordation, it had no effect on third parties because it was not filed for
recordation in the conveyance records. 9 The reason why recordation originally
was required to be in the conveyance rather than mortgage records has to do with
the difficulties encountered in translating common law security interests into
civilian terms. Typically, in common law, the way to obtain a security interest
in a lessor's rental income stream is through an assignment of that right. The
common law "assignment" is intended to be used as a security device. In
Louisiana, however, "assignment' refers to a transfer of ownership and is a
species of sale.' Louisiana does not have a concept of transferring title to
secure a loan.6' Yet, even though the statute always contemplated a security
interest, because it was originally called an "assignment of rent," recordation was
required to be in the conveyance records.
The statute now provides two ways ofperfecting the security interest. First,
if all the lender wants is a security interest in the rental stream, then the lender
may file an act (denominated either as an act of assignment or pledge) in the
conveyance records of the parish where the immovable is located. Second, if the
lender intends to take a mortgage on the lessor's property interest as well as a
security interest in the rental stream, then the security interest may be contained
in the act of mortgage itself. Prior to 1995 it was necessary to file the act of
mortgage in both the mortgage records (to obtain the mortgage)6" and in the
conveyance records to perfect the security interest in the rents. After September,
1995, however, a lender who has included a right to the rents in the mortgage

57. La. I.S. 10:9-101-604 (1993 and Supp. 1999). In Louisiana, the statute is officially
entitled the Louisiana Commercial Laws, but for the purposes ofthis paper, it will be referred to as
U.C.C. article 9. Out of state attorneys are cautioned that the Louisiana version is different in many
respects from the Model provisions of U.C.C. article 9.
58. La. R.S. 10:9-104 (1993 and Supp. 1999), addedby 1988 La. Acts No. 528, § 1.
59. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. CC &F Baton Rouge Dev. Co., 647 So. 2d 1131 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1994).
60. The Civil Code provisions on assignment are found in Title VII ("Sale") Chapter 15
("Assignment of Rights").
61. See, eg., in the context of mortgages, Miller v. Shotwell, 38 La. Ann. 890 (1886), holding
that a purported sale to secure a loan is merely a mortgage and not a transfer of title. This rule is

inaccordance with the title theory adopted by the American Law Institute's Restatement ofthe Law
of Property, Mortgage, § 3.2 (1997).
62. La. Civ. Code art. 3308; La. R.S. 9:2721 (1991 and Supp. 1999).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

need file the document only in the mortgage records.63 Because of this change
in the law, lenders who contemplate taking a security interest in a landlord's
rents must check both the mortgage and conveyance records and carefully read
every mortgage to see if it contains a rental assignment.
The rents that may be assigned are not limited to existing lease income.
Anticipated and future rents may be the subject of the assignment and no special
language is required; it is sufficient if the instrument contains a general
description of the leases and rents."
There is a special requirement that the immovable property be carefully
described in order that the security interest in rents be effective against third
parties; the property description must be one "which, if contained in a mortgage
of the immovable, would cause such mortgage to be effective as to third persons
if the mortgage were properly filed for record under the laws of this state."6
The rent assignment also must "state the amount of the obligation secured
thereby or the maximum amount ofthe obligation that may be outstanding at any
time from time to time that such assignment secures.""
The length of time that the inscription of the rental assignment affects third
parties depends upon whether it is contained in a post-September 1995 mortgage.
If it is, then the effect continues as long as the mortgage continues to affect third
parties. The general rule is that if the obligation the mortgage describes (e.g. the
note) is due less than nine years from the date of the document, the effect of
inscription lasts ten years from the date of the document (not ten years from
inscription in the public records).67 If the obligation the mortgage describes is
due nine years or more from the date of the document, however, then the
inscription lasts six years from the maturity date described. 6" A timely
reinscription of a mortgage preserves its original rank (it ranks from the date it
was filed69) and
extends the time of inscription ten years from the date of
70
reinscription.
On the other hand, if the security interest in rents occurred prior to
September 1995 but after September 1, 1990, the same time frames set forth
above for reinscription apply, but now the inscription must be in the conveyance
records.7 ' For security interests in rents perfectedprior to August 31, 1990, the
same general rules are applicable.72

63. La. R.S. 9:4401(AXI) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.
64. La. R.S. 9:4401(AX2) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.
65. Id.
66. La. P.S. 9:4401(A) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3. This language
is essentially identical to the requirements ofa description of a mortgage obligation under Louisiana
Civil Code article 3288, as amended by 1991 La. Acts No. 652, § 1.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 3328.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 3329.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 3308.
70. La. Civ. Code art. 3334.
71. La. 1KS. 9:4401(H(1) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.
72. La. IKS. 9:4401(H)(2) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.
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Reinscription is relatively easy; a written notice ofreinscription may be done
by the lender and no signature of the lessor is required. Likewise, no notary or
witnesses are necessary. The reinscription notice must "state the name of the
assignor as it appears in the recorded instrument and recordation number or other
appropriate recordation information of the instrument or of a prior notice of
reinscription and shall declare that the instrument is reinscribed."' 3 If the
reinscription is filed too late-after the original inscription has lapsed-it
remains valid, but instead of retaining the original ranking date, the lender gets
a new ranking date starting with the untimely reinscription7
A Louisiana assignment of rents gives a lender tracing rights in the rental
stream equivalent to the rights of a secured lender under U.C.C. article 9. An
assignment of rents allows a lender to assert a security interest in "any
identifiable proceeds" including collections and cash on hand. 5
Because a rent assignment may be "absolute" or "conditional" or "collateral," '6 a tenant has no obligation to remit rents to the secured party until notified
in writing."' Louisiana law specifically prohibits any clause in a lease contract
that prohibits the assignment of rents or that requires prior notice to the tenant
before creating the assignment.
V. THE LESSOR'S PRIVLEGE
A. Ranking a Lessor's PrivilegeAgainst a UC.C. 9 Security Interest; The
U.C.C. 9 SecurityInterestAl ways Wins
Louisiana historically has granted lessors legal rights over certain movables
found on the leased premises through the lessor's privilege. There is no
requirement that there be a written lease in order for a lessor's privilege to exist;
thus, the privilege will affect movables on the leased premises even though there
is nothing in the public records to alert third parties about the existence of the
lease. Prior to 1990, this privilege had the capacity to interfere with the security
interests that lenders obtained from tenants, for a Louisiana chattel mortgage on
the tenant's movables could be outranked by a pre-existing lessor's privilege.79
If the lease had existed prior to the tenant seeking financing, the tenant's lender's
only option was to attempt to obtain a voluntary subordination from the lessor.8 0

73.

La. R.S. 9:4401(HXI) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.

74.

Id.

75.

La. K.S. 9:4401f)(1) (1997).

76. La. &S. 9:4401(A) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.
77. La. &S. 9:4401(GXI) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.
78. La. K-S. 9:4401(GX4) (1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1087, § 3.
79. For a discussion of this entire area, see Acadlana Bank v. Foreman, 352 So. 2d 674 (La.
1977), reh'g denied.
80. Cf. United States Hoffrnan Machinery Corp. v. Valeteria, 9 La. App. 272, 120 So. 119 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1928).
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With the advent of Louisiana's version of U.C.C. article 9 in 1990,"1 the
secured party's rights became far easier to obtain and perfect. By statute, a
lender who perfects a Louisiana U.C.C. 9 security interest on movables will
always outrank the lessor's privilege, regardless of whether the U.C.C. 9 security
interest is perfected before or after the lessor's privilege comes into existence.8
The lessor's privilege, however, remains a powerful right and lenders need
to be aware of the broad powers of a landlord. Under Civil Code provisions that
have remained essentially unchanged for almost 130 years,83 Louisiana law has
permitted the lessor of immovable property to exercise a privilege on three
different classifications of movables found on the property leased: the property
of the tenant; the property ofthe subtenant; and the property of third persons that
is on the premises for an extended period of time rather than transiently.
B. The Lessor's Privilegeon the Tenant's Property

To protect the payment of rent and other obligations under the lease,
Louisiana Civil Code article 2705 grants the lessor a privilege on property ofthe
tenant found on the leased premises. The lessor's privilege on the property of

the tenant is unique in that it is not limited to property located on the leased
premises at the time of seizure; the lessor may pursue the tenant's property for
up to fifteen days after the movables leave the premises without the lessor's

consent."4 If the items have left the premises for more than fifteen days, the
lessor's privilege is lost, 5 although the privilege may reattach if the items are
later returned to the premises.8 6

81. La. R.S. 10:9-101 etseq. (1993), addedby 1988 La. Acts No. 528, § 1, effective January
1, 1990.
82. La. R.S. 9:4770 (1991), addedby 1989 La. Acts No. 137, § 5, asamended by 1997 La.
Acts No. 1295, § 1.
83. The Louisiana Civil Code statutes on lessor's privileges are found in Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2705-2709. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2706 and 2707 have remain unchanged since their
enactment in the 1870 Code.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2705 was amended in 1934, at the height of the Depression, to expand
the list of items that are exempt from the lessor's privilege; it was amended again in 1979 to change
the word "wife" to "spouse."
Louisiana Civil Code article 2709 was amended in 1960 to legislatively overrule Edmonds v.
Totem Stores,229 La. 467, 86 So. 2d 104 (1956) and thus, after amendment, permitted in the words
of the Louisiana Law Institute "a lessor to enforce his privilege on [the tenant's) movables removed
from the leased premises without his consent as long as these are in legal custody." The article was
amended again in 1990 to add a paragraph concerning injunctions for a lessor's privilege involving
rights on crops and government entitlements (La. Civ. Code art. 2709(c)).
84. La. Civ. Code art. 2709.
85. See Boylston v. Jones, 153 So. 53 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
86. "[Ihe earliest time that the lessor's privilege can affect movables is that time when the
lease is in effect and the movables are on the premises." Acadiana Bank v. Foreman, 352 So. 2d
674, 678 (La. 1977), reh 'gdenied.

1999]

MICHAEL H. RUBIN & S. JESS SPERRY

The privilege extends to all of the tenant's property on any portion of the
leased premises, whether outside or inside.
C. The Lessor'sPrivilegeon the Propertyof a Sub-Tenant
Ifa tenant subleases the property, the subtenant's property likewise is subject
privilege; however, the lessor's right against the subtenant's property
lessor's
to a
the tenant.87
is much narrower than the right a lessor has against the property of
First, there is no right to pursue the subtenant's property if it leaves the leased
property. Second, the lessor may collect from the subtenant's movables only the
amount that the subtenant owes the tenant. For example, if the tenant owes the
lessor $1000, but the subtenant owes the tenant only $400, only $400 of the
subtenant's property is subject to the lessor's privilege, regardless of how much
property the subtenant has in the leased area."
D. The Lessor's Privilegeon the Properyof Third Persons
The right of a lessor against the property of a third person who is not a
subtenant is highly circumscribed, and the Civil Code rules narrow significantly
the lessor's privilege when it is sought to be asserted against movables belonging
89
to a third person that are located on the leased premises.
First, the property of the third person is only subject to the lessor's privilege
if it is found in a specific location-essentially, under the roof of a dwelling or
commercial establishment." Property of a thiid person outside on leased
premises-such as a boat left in a driveway of a rented house-may not be
seized, even if the boat is permanently being parked in the driveway. Thus, the
lessor's privilege against property of a third party is very limited, in contrast to
the lessor's privilege against the property of the lessee. A movable belonging
to the lessee might be seized anywhere on the leased property, but a movable
owned by a third party can be subject to a lessor's privilege only if it is
"contained in the house or store."'" Note that the Code article does not state
"garage" or "shed" or even "under a covering"; since privileges are to be strictly
and narrowly construed,92 the express language of the Civil Code controls.

87. La. Civ. Code art. 2706.
88. See Franek v. Flynt, 132 La. 327,61 So. 390 (1913), reh'gdenied. See also Kenneson v.
Bain, 8 So. 2d 722 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1942).
89. La. Civ. Code arts. 2707, 2708.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2707.
91.

La. Civ. Code art 2707. In Boone v. Brown , 201 La. 917, 10 So. 2d 701 (La. 1942), the

Court held that a third party's automobile trailer located outside on leased property was not subject
to a lessor's privilege.
92. As the title to Louisiana Civil Code article 3185 indicates, "Privileges [are] established only
by law, stricti juris."
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Second, even if the property of a third person is "contained in the house or
store," that is not enough to subject it to the lessor's privilege. The other
requirement is found in Louisiana Civil Code article 2708 and mandates that the
third person's property not be there "transiently or accidentally."9 While the
older cases indicate that the burden of proof of demonstrating that the property
is only there transiently remains on the third party claiming ownership, the case
law is clear that a third person who proves that a lessor acted improperly is
entitled to '.counsel fees and actual damages." '
In 1984, Article 2707 was amended to allow a third person whose property
was seized under a lessor's privilege to intervene into the proceedings and, "if
he fails to do so, the property may be sold as though it belonged to the lessee."
In other words, although Louisiana law provides judicial means for a lessor to
seize property of third parties, it provides no mechanism for notice to that third
party, no procedure to inform the court ordering sequestration that the property
of a third party is on the premises, and no requirement that the petition allege
that the third person's property is "contained in the house or store." If a third
person has no notice of the proceedings, it is obviously impossible for the third
person to intervene to claim its rights, including the right to seek and collect
attorneys' fees and actual damages for wrongful seizure; yet, Louisiana Civil
Code article 2707 punishes the third party who has no notice by allowing the
property to be sold "as though it belonged to the lessee." These provisions, some
argue, may violate basic principles of due process.9"
E. Exemptions from the Lessor's Privilege
In 1960 Louisiana enacted a statute exempting from seizure under any writ,
mandate, or process whatsoever, certain personal property of any debtor. This
statute applies regardless of how the debt arose and is not limited to lessees who
owe money to their lessors. It applies, with certain limited exceptions, to all
borrowers whose creditors attempt to seize their assets.9 For over a hundred
years, however, the Louisiana Civil Code had exempted certainpersonal property
of a tenant from a lessor's privilege.97 A comparison of the 1960 general
statute with the Civil Code is interesting. For example, a tenant is entitled to
retain all "plates, dishes, knives, forks, and spoons,"98 regardless of from what
material they are made, while the general exemption statute only eliminates a
creditor's right to seize "nonsterling silverware."" Thus, only the tenant under

93. Turner v. Ratcliff, 152 So. 379, 380 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
94. Id.
95. For more on this topic, see infra at Section V.G.
96. La. R.S. 13:3881 (1991 and Supp. 1999), added by 1960 La. Acts No. 32, § 6, and as
amended through 1992 La. Acts No. 829, § 1.
97. La. Civ. Code art. 2705.
98. Id.
99. La. R.S. 13:3881(4Xa) (1991 and Supp. 1999).
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the Civil Code is allowed to retain all silverware, no matter how valuable,
whether made of actual silver or otherwise. Both provisions exempt arms and
"military accoutrements,"'"M bedding, clothing, dining room furniture, cooking
utensils, and tools of the trade,' but only the general statute exempts household pets and certainwedding and engagementrings, certain vehicles, and family
portraits. °' Neither exempts television sets, radios, or video or digital
recording devices.
The obvious purpose of the exemptions is to prevent creditors from
depriving a debtor/lessee of all items necessary to function and to earn a living.
F. The Lessor's Right to Obtain a Writ ofSequestration Without Bond
"Sequestration" is the Louisiana term for a prejudgment seizure to protect
a security interest.0 3 The Louisiana sequestration statutes for the lessor's
privilege are different from those allowing sequestration under other privileges
and mortgages. If a creditor holds a mortgage on land, then to obtain a writ of
sequestration the creditor must allege the existence of the mortgage, must assert
that it is within the power of the mortgagee to "conceal, dispose of, or waste the
property or the revenues therefrom" during the pendency of the case, and must
On the other hand,
put up a bond before a writ of sequestration is issued.'
before the rent is
obtained
be
may
privilege
a sequestration based on a lessor's
will remove the
lessee
the
that
believe
to
reason
good
has
due "if the lessor
not put up a
need
lessor
the
and
privilege,"
lessor's
the
property subject to
05
bond.
While Louisiana Civil Code article 2706 provides that the lessor has a
privilege for the payment of rent "and other obligations of the lease," the
privilege is broader than the right of sequestration. The right of seizure is limited
by statute, and it appears to apply only to the lessee's obligation to pay rent as
°
opposed to other obligations under a lease." Thus, strong arguments can be

100. La. Civil Code art. 2705; La. R.S. 13:3881(4Xc) (1991 and Supp. 1999).
101. Id.; La. R.S. 13:3881(AX2X4Xa) (1991). The Civil Code exemption for tools of the trade
have been held to apply only to individuals and not to business entities such as corporations.
Ringham v. ComputerAge of New Orleans, Inc., 539 So. 2d 864 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
102. Id.; La. P.S. 13:3881(AX2), (4), (5) (1991).
103.

La. Code Civ. P. art. 3571.

104. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3571, 3574.
105. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3572, 3575.
106. La. Civ. Code art. 3218 provides:
The right which the lessor has over the products of the estate, and on the movables which
are found on the placed leased, for his rent, is of a higher nature than mere privilege.
The latter is only enforced on the price arising from the sale of movables to which it
applies. It does not enable the creditor to take or keep the effects specially. The lessor,

on the contrary, may take the effects themselves and retainthem until he is paid.

La. Civ. Code art. 3218 (emphasis supplied).
This article, when read in pari materia with Article 2706, clearly implies that the right of the
lessor to sequester, I.e.. "retain," the lessee's movables is limited to the obligation to pay rent, since
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made that sequestration is not available if the lessee is in default on portions of
the lease that have nothing to do with payment of rent.
G. Due Processand the Lessor's Right to Obtaina Writ of Sequestration
Beginning with the seminal case of Sniadach v. Family FinanceCorp. of
Bay View, 107 the United States Supreme Court has held that pre-judgment
seizures of property can violate federal due process rights unless strict standards
are followed. Sniadach involved an attempted garnishment of wages, including
the freezing of the disputed assets. The Court found that "where the taking of
one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that
absent notice and a prior hearing," such a procedure "violates fundamental
08
principles of due process.'
In Fuentes v. Shevin,0 9 Florida and Pennsylvania writs of replevin statutes
were held unconstitutional, for they did not provide for prior notice or an
opportunity to be heard. That case alleged a violation of due process rights and
triggered the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court found that the requirement of a bond by the seizing party is only a "minimal deterrent";" 0 the most
important protection is "an informed evaluation by a neutral official.""' In
other words, there is a two-fold test: A "neutral official" (which later cases
made clear meant a judge) must be involved in reviewing a seizing creditor's
allegations, and the evaluation must be an "informed one," i.e. the documents and
pleadings must disclose on their face the basis of legal right asserted.

that right is limited by the phrase in Civil Code article 3218 "until he is paid." Likewise, the last
sentence of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3572, provides: "If the rentis paidwhen it
becomes due, the costs shall be paid by the plaintiff." This provision requires the lessor to pay the
costs of the sequestration if, after the lessor obtains asequestration to protect the right to collect the
upcoming rent, the lessee then pays the rent "when it becomes due." Thus, the Civil Code appears
to contemplate that sequestration may only be obtained in connection with claims for rent.
The history of this Code of Civil Procedure article supports this approach. Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 3575 replaced the old Code of Practice rule of "provisional seizure," which
was a method under which the lessor could seize movable property without a bond. Provisional
seizure, however, was extremely limited, and it applied to only "certain enumerated cases of
privilege." Hochfelder v. Russell, 126 So. 219, 220 (La. 1930). In Hochfelder, the Louisiana
Supreme Court expressly rejected aclaim that a lessor could enforceran alleged "implied" obligation
of continuous occupancy through "provisional seizure"--that is,a seizure without bond rather than
a sequestration with bond. Thus, the rule under the Code of Practice appeared clear, "provisional
seizure" could not be used to enforce non-monetary lease obligations. That same result is carried
forward in the language of the current Civil Code and Code of Procedure articles.
C. Philip Thomas v. Thomas Group of Louisiana, Inc., Nos. 98-608-A-MI and 98-609-C-MI
(M.D. La. March 2, 1999).
107. 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969).
108. Id. at 342, 89 S.Ct. at 1823.
109. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 177, 180 (1972).
110. Id. at 83, 92 S.Ct. at 1995.
111. Id.at 83, 92 S.Ct. at 1996.
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While Fuentes reserved for another day the question of the right of a

security interest holder to protect that security interest, the Court stressed that

such a right could occur only "so long as those creditors have tested their claim
' 2
to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing." " That hearing must
be a real one "aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity,
of the underlying claim ' "'3 against the one whose property is taken. Thus, the
two-fold test was to be applied. The prior hearing must be "fair" and the
underlying claim and security interest must be demonstrated at that time.
The Supreme Court continues to emphasize the strict requirements of due
4
process in prejudgment seizures. In Connecticut v. Doehr," the Court struck
down a statute that allowed prejudgment attachment of real estate without a prior
notice and hearing. The Court contrasted the higher degree of scrutiny given to
deprivations of movable property with the lesser degree of scrutiny given to
attachments of real estate; yet the court emphasized that, even with real estate
attachments, due process violations are not to be tolerated. The Court noted that
1'5
attachment of real estate "is perhaps less" of an impingement on property
rights than attachment ofmovables, but the Courtnonetheless held that "even the
temporary or partial impairments to [immovable] property rights that attachments
... and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protec16
tion."'
In Wyatt v. Cole,"' the Court again emphasized how serious due process
violations are in the realm of prejudgment property deprivations. In Wyatt the
issue was a Mississippi writ of replevin under which an ostensible creditor used
a state statute to seize cattle, a tractor, and other personal property of his partner.
The question before the court was not whether the state statute was constitutional-the lower courts had held that the statute violated due process and that issue
was not appealed-ratherthe question was whether private parties could be sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages. The Court rejected a claim that private
parties who invoke unconstitutional statutes are entitled to "qualified immunity"
from suit.
The Supreme Court has had an opportunity to address Louisiana's sequestration statutes in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.1"8 There, the question was a
creditor's right to seize movables to protect its vendor's privilege. The Supreme
Court found the sequestration statutes valid insofar as a Louisiana vendor's
privileges were concerned. Mitchell appears to settle the question of the validity
ofprejudgment seizure through a writ of sequestration when the property seized

112.

Id. at 96, 92 S.Ct. at 2002.

113. Id. at 97, 95 S. Ct. at 2003 (citing Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395
U.S. 337, 342, 89 S. Ct. 11820, 1823 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

114. 501 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991).
115.

501 U.S. at 12, 111 S. CL at 2113.

116. Id.
117. 504 U.S. 158, 112 S.Ct. 1827 (1992), wnt denied, 510 U.S. 977, 114 S.Ct. 470 (1993).
118. 416 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
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belongs to the tenant; however, left unanswered is whether a lessor may
constitutionally seek a writ of sequestration of property of a third party." 9
Therefore, while a lessor may seize the property of a tenant without a bond,
and while the Louisiana sequestration statutes as applied to the lessee's property
seem to meet constitutional requirements, cautious practitioners may want to be
sure that the property being seized belongs to the tenant. If it belongs to a third
party, the cautious practitioner may want to both: notify the court that the
property is not owned by the tenant and explicitly set forth in the pleadings the
factual basis for the claimed privilege; and notify the third party of the seizure.
These two actions should obviate a due process challenge to the seizure of
property of a third person found on the leased premises.
VI. THE LESSEE'S GRANT OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE LEASEHOLD
ESTATE

A.

"LeaseholdEstate" Is a Term that Has Significance in Common Law, Not
Civil Law

Both the 1808 and 1825 editions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 were
printed in both French and English; the French text was the original and
translation errors occurred when the English text was being created. In case of
conflict between the two versions, Louisiana courts have held uniformly that the

119. It can be argued that there is a question whether Louisiana statutes may be constitutionally
applied to allow a lessor to seek to sequester, under a lessor's privilege, property of a third person
on the leased premises without a bond and without making any attempt to notify the third person
before or after the seizure.
The Supreme Court warned in strong dicta in Connecticut v. Doehr, "Without a bond, at the time
ofattachment, the danger that these property rights may be wrongfully deprived remains unacceptably
high even with such safeguards as a hearing or exigency requirement." 501 U.S. at 19, 111 S. Ct.
at 2117. Further, although Louisiana law provides a mechanism for third parties to seek to recoup
their seized property (La. Civ. Code art. 2705), it contains no provisions requiring that the seizing
lessor give notice to the third person before or after seizure.
Thus, cases involving a lessor who seizes property of a third person seem distinguishable from
Mitchell, where the person who bought property on credit and whose property was subject to a
vendor's privilege was actually made a defendant in the proceeding and could seek to sue on the
bond that is put up by the creditor prior to seizure. As Mitchell noted, when there is a sequestration
under Louisiana vendor's privilege, the "system protects the debtor's (property] interest in every
conceivable way, except allowing him to have the property to start with, and this is done in pursuit
of what we deem an acceptable arrangementpendentelite to put the property in the possession of
the party who furnishes protection against loss or damage to the other pending trial on the merits."
416 U.S. at 618, 94 S. Ct. at 1905. Here, however, the system contains no similar protections for
third parties whose property is seized by a lessor. The third party is not named a defendant or even
mentioned in the petition. The third party is not given notice of any kind. As the Supreme Court
noted in Gilbertv. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (1997), even where the state
itself must act quickly because of some exigency, "postdepivation process" is an absolute
requirement; here there is none.
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French text is controlling.' A more difficult translation effort faces Louisiana
lawyers today; that is the problem of translating common law terms into civilian
ones.
The term "leasehold estate" is unknown in the civil law, which does not
recognize estates in land.' The term "leasehold estate" describes one of the
2
two categories of "estates" under English law and dates back to feudal times.
the
that
Although well known in English common law, Justice Story reported
contract of leasehold estates played little role in America's colonial history."s
Notwithstanding the fact that the term "leasehold estate" is meaningless in
24
Civil Law, the term crops up often in contracts cited in reported cases.
There even were occasions in the 1920s when the Louisiana Supreme Court,

120. For a brief overview of the history of the Louisiana Civil Codes, see A.N. Yiannopolous,
The Civil Codes of Louisiana, West's Louisiana Civil Code, at XXVII (1999 ed.).
121. See A.N. Yiannopolis, 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, §226, at 422-23 (3d ed. 1991). Cf.
Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, F.S.B., 108 F.3d 576, 580 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'don other
grounds, 118 S. CL 921, 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
122. Daniel E. Werner, Renting in Collegetown, 84 Comell L. Rev. 543, 547 (1999) (footnotes
omitted):
Feudalism as well as English law developed two categories of estates: the freehold estates-consisting of the fee simple, and the fee tail and the life estate-and the nonfreehold, or leasehold, estate-consisting of the "term of years."
The leasehold estate did not have social significance in the feudal system; rather, this
estate established a relationship between the landlord and the tenant and based that
relationship solely on a personal contract. The tenant did not retain rights in the property
until the law allowed him to enforce the contract, which thereby secured his promised
interest in the property. Nevertheless, the tenant's interest in the property relied as much
on contract law as it did on property law.
123. Justice Joseph Story, ICommentaries on the Constitution ofthe United States 160 (1833).
See also G. William Rice, Of Cold Steel and Blueprints: Musings of an Old Country Lawyer on
Crime,Jurisprudence,andthe TribalAttorney'sRole inDevelopingTribalSovereignty,7-WTR Kan.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 31, 64-65 n.127 (1997).
124. See eg., Succession of Becker, 704 So. 2d 825, 826 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997), reh'g
denied, writ denied,718 So. 2d 482 (1998) ('Decedent left to his two adult daughters his separate
property, particularly, a particular legacy of his interest in a leasehold estate in Gonzales,
Louisiana... .");Moity v. New Iberia Bank, 612 So. 2d 140, 143 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) C'... or
the leasehold estate if this mortgage is on a leasehold... ."; American Bank &Trust Co. of Baton
Rouge v. Louisiana Savings Ass'n, 386 So. 2d 96, 116 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), reh'g denied
(". . . is the owner of the Leasehold Estate on the property shown on Exhibit A...."); Bertrand v.
Sandoz, 260 La. 239, 275, 255 So. 2d 754, 766 (La. 1971) C'.... the trust proposes to issue bonds
secured by the 'leasehold estate' ..... ); Herbert v. Police Jury of West Baton Rouge Parish, 200
So. 2d 877, 896 (La. App. 1st Cir.), reh'gdenied, writrefused,250 La. 1032, 201 So. 2d 520 (1967)
("the parties hereto reserve the right by written mutual consent at any time and from time to time to
amend this agreement for the purpose of effecting the release of and removal from this agreement
and the leasehold estate created hereby... :); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co.,
234 La. 939, 941, 102 So. 2d 223, 224 (1958) ("[Tin the contract it is stipulated that 'The leasehold
estates consisting of said Section 31 .... 1";Diebert, Bancroft & Ross Co., Ltd v. Marrero., 117
F.3d 160, 165 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 123 F.3d 279 (1997) ("... all of Debtor's leasehold interest
in and to 'the land .... ').
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rather than relying upon civilian authority, looked to English common law,'"
an event not likely to occur today, when Louisiana courts conscientiously apply
12 6
civilian methodology and refer to civilian sources.
B. The Lessee's Granting of a Security Interestin Its Rights Under a Lease
With this background in mind, it was only a matter of time before the
Louisiana Supreme Court would have to deal with the interpretation of a lessee's
mortgage on its "leasehold estate." The occasion came in Carrierev. Bank of
Louisiana.'2 The court had to address whether the granting of a mortgage on
a "leasehold estate" constituted a grant of a security interest in less than the
entire lease-was it a mortgage on all of the lessee's rights or merely on the
lessee's rights of occupancy, use, and enjoyment?
In Carriere,the lessor leased undeveloped property to the lessee and the
lessee planned to develop the property. The lessee borrowed money to build a
restaurant and granted a collateral mortgage' 28 on the lessee's "leasehold
estate." Upon default under the lease, the lender filed a petition for executory
process, and, at a sheriff's sale, the lender purchased the "leasehold estate" that
was the subject ofthe collateral mortgage, "which included the building, as well
as the improvements."'' 2 Ultimately, the lessor filed a suit against the lender,
which had acquired the interest that the lessee had mortgaged, and the lessor
sought to hold the bank liable for the rental payments under the lease from the
date of the judicial sale, plus property taxes and necessary repairs to the building.
The court found that the lender was not liable and that the lessor was
entitled to nothing from the lender, who acquired through foreclosure only the
lessee's "leasehold estate." The court noted that the right of use, occupancy and
enjoyment possessed by the lessee under a lease may be severed from the lessee's
obligation to pay rents under the lease."' Applying this precept, the court
recognized that a lessee may mortgage its interest in a lease either by (1)
mortgaging the entire lease, which includes all of the lessee's rights, duties and

125. Cf.Jansen v. Bellamore, 147 La. 900, 86 So. 324 (1920).
126. See, eg., Carbon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 719 So. 2d 437 (La. 1998), reh'gdenied; Rousseve
v. Jones, 704 So. 2d 229 (La. 1997); King v. Louviere, 543 So. 2d 1327 (La. 1989); Todd v. State
Through Dep't ofNatural Resources, 456 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1983); and Everything on Wheels Subaru,
Inc. v. Subaru S., Inc., 616 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1993).
127. 702 So. 2d 648 (La. 1996), reh'gdenied.
128. A collateral mortgage is a Louisiana security device that can be used, if the parties so
intend and prepare the documents appropriately, to secure a fluctuating line of credit. For more on
collateral mortgages, see Rubin & Strohschein, supra note 13; Michael H. Rubin et al., Is the
CollateralMortgage Obsolete?,41 La. BJ. 529 (1994); Michael H. Rubin, Recent Developments in
the Law: Security Devices, 53 La. L. Rev. 969 (1993); David S. Willenzik, FutureAdvance Priority
Rights of Louisiana CollateralMortgages: Legislative Revisions, New Rules, and a Modem
Alternative, 55 La. L Rev. 1 (1994).
129. Carriere,702 So. 2d at 651.
130. Id. at 666.
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obligations under the lease, including obligation to pay rent, or (2) mortgaging
only its right of occupancy, use and enjoyment. In the first instance, in which
a lessee mortgages its entire lease, if the lessee defaults on the mortgage and the
mortgage holder forecloses, the purchaser at the sheriff's sale will become the
owner of the entire lease and will acquire all of the lessee's rights, duties and
obligation under the lease. Absent a specific and unambiguous subordination by
the lessor of its rights to the rights of the lessee, the purchaser acquires the
original lessee's obligation to pay rents, in addition to the original lessee's right
of occupancy, use and enjoyment, as well as all other rights and obligations. The
court noted that, however, if the lessee mortgages only its right of occupancy,
use and enjoyment, then the acquirer at the sheriff's sale becomes the owner of
only the original lessee's right of occupancy, use and enjoyment under the lease,
while the original lessee/mortgagor retains the obligation to pay rent to the
lessor. In this latter situation, absent a specific and unambiguous subordination
in favor of such acquirer from the lessor, the owner of the right of occupancy,
use and enjoyment may lose its right to the occupancy, use and enjoyment should
the lessor cause the lease to be terminated as a result of the original lessee's nonpayment of rent. 3' In this situation, if the lessee had constructed improvements which had been owned by the original lessee and which are now owned
by the purchaser as a result of the sheriffs sale, the lessor will be free, under
Louisiana Civil Code article493, to demandremoval ofthe improvements within
32
ninety (90) days in addition to the purchaser having to vacate the premises.'
The Carrierecourt found that the lessee's mortgage of its "leasehold estate"
fell into the second category and that no magical words were needed to create
a mortgage of only the lessee's right of occupancy, use and enjoyment. The
court held that, in light of the clauses in the lease, the use of the phrase "that
leasehold estate" indicated an intent by the lessee to mortgage only its right of
occupancy, use and enjoyment, and, therefore, the acquiring party did not acquire
the obligation to pay rent, which remained with the original tenant.
The interests of the lessor, lessee and lender differ significantly. The lessor
would prefer that the lessee's mortgage be ofthe entire lease and not merely the
right of occupancy, use and enjoyment, that the lease provide that it will not be
subordinated to any leasehold mortgage, and that the lease mandate that any
occupancy by a leasehold mortgagee or purchaser of its rights at a sheriff's sale
shall obligate the leasehold mortgagee/purchaser to pay rent. A lessee, on the
other hand, would prefer that the lease not restrict its method of mortgaging its
rights; lessees believe this should be a matter between the lessee and its lender.
Lessees therefore attempt to include language in leases that will allow it to
mortgage its leasehold rights in any commercially reasonable fashion. Lessees
desire language that would compel the lessor to allow a mortgage on terms that
a commercial lender will grant, as opposed to allowing the lessor to restrict the

131.
132.

Id. at 666, 667.
Id. at 667.
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mortgage.'
Finally, the tenant's lender would prefer for the mortgage to be
of the right of occupancy, use and enjoyment only, as opposed to the entire lease,
to avoid having the obligation to pay rent in the event of a foreclosure.
Alternatively, a tenant's lender may consider taking a mortgage on the entire
lease if there is a clear subordination of the lessor's rights.
VII. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETING
Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2725, the lessee has the right to assign
the lease or sublet the leased premises without the consent of the lessor, unless
expressly prohibited in the lease. An assignment, however, is not a sublease.
In an assignment of a lease, the assignor transfers all of its rights and obligations
in the lease; in a sublease, the lessee/sublessor retains some control or interest in
the lease. 34
In a sublease, there exists no privity of contract between a lessor and a
sublessee; a lessor must prove termination of its lease before it may evict a
sublessee. The lessor does not have an action for past-due rent directly against
the sublessee, but its action instead is against the lessee. In the case of a
sublease of leased premises, the sublessor (the original lessee) retains an interest
in the lease, the sublessee's rights are governed by the terms ofthe sublease, and
the sublessee assumes no obligations to the original lessor."'
By contrast, in an assignment of a lease, the lessee's entire rights and
obligations under the lease are conveyed to the assignee. The assignee becomes
liable for all of the obligations of the lessee. Because an assignment of a lease
involves a transfer of all rights in the lease, it is treated as an ordinary sale of an
incorporeal governed by the Louisiana Civil Code articles on sales.' 36 Because
the assignee acquires the rights of its assignor and becomes a party to that
original document, the assignee may enforce the lease directly against the lessor.
The lessee/assignor is not released from any of its obligations under the lease,
unless the lessor expressly agrees to such a release.
A lease which prohibits sublease of the leased premises without the lessor's
consent has been held to prohibit an assignment without the lessor's consent,'"
for the terms in a lease prohibiting sublease or assignment are strictly construed

133. Cf. Kavanaugh v. Berkett, 407 So. 2d 645 (La. 1981), discussed supra at Section Il.
134. Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 231 La. 474, 91 So. 2d 762 (1956); J. F. Auderer Labs.,
Inc. v. Deas, 223 La. 923, 67 So. 2d 179 (1953), reh'gdenied; Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T. L. James &
Co., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. La. 1993); Pinetree Assocs. v. Subway Restaurants, Inc., 643
So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 647 So. 2d 1120 (1994).
135. Pepper v. Pyramid Oil& Gas Corp., 287 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), reh'g denied;
Hebert v. Hines, 615 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
136. Tomlinson v. Thurmon, 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (La. 1938); PinetreeAssocs., 643 So.
2d 1271.
137. Serio v. Stewart Investments, Inc., 427 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ den1ed, 430
So. 2d 97 (1983).
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against the lessee. 3 " If a lease requires the written consent of the lessor to a
sublease or assignment, there is no requirement that the lessor be reasonable in
granting or refusing to grant consent to the sublease or assignment, and courts
will protect the lessor's right, unless the lessor is found to have clearly abused
that right. 39 Alternatively, if the lease specifically provides that the lessor's
consent may not be unreasonably withheld, then the lessor's right will be
protected, unless the lessor's refusal is found to be unreasonable. 4 It is for
this reason that many lessors put a clause in their leases that the lessor "may
refuse to grant permission for assignment or subletting for any reason or for no
reason."
Lenders usually are concerned about the lessee's right to assign or sublet.
If a lessee is seeking financing, its lender may prefer to see a clause in the lease
granting the lessee the right to assign or sublease with minimum restrictions from
the landlord; if there are restrictions, the lender would like to see that the
landlord's consent cannot be "unreasonablywithheld." On the other hand, if the
lender is financing the lessor, the lender may want to be sure that a tenant's
assignment or subleasing does not occur unless the lessor has given its prior
consent. The lessor's lender would tend to agree with its borrower that the lessor
should have maximum flexibility to refuse to grant subleases, for part of the
lender's decision to grant the loan may depend upon the creditworthiness of the
tenants.
VIII. ATrORNmENT
"Attormnent" is a common law term 14 1 used to describe a contractual
arrangement among a lessor, lessee and a third party. An attornment agreement
is one in which (a) the lessee agrees to abide by the lease, even though the
original lessor may cease to hold rights in the property, and in which (b) third
parties and future lessors (including lenders who foreclose on or succeed to the
rights of the original lessor) agree to recognize the lease and maintain the tenant
in peaceable possession of the premises on the same terms and conditions called
for in the lease.' 42 While the word "attornment" stems from common law, at

138. Id.
139. Truschinger v. Pak, 513 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1987); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979).
140. Caplan v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1985), reh'g denied.
141. "Attomment' stems from the term "attom," which, in feudal and Old English law, referred
to a formal turning over by the lord of the services of his tenant. Under the feudal systems of tenure,
the relationship of landlord and tenant created a close, personal relationship, requiring that the
landlord not only deliver the property and provide undisturbed possession, but also protect the tenant
and his family. Due to the close, personal relationship, the landlord was prohibited from substituting
another landlord without the consent of the tenant Raines v. Hindman, 71 S.E. 738 (Ga. 1911);
Purvis v. Shuman, 112 N.E. 679 (111.1916); Knapp v. Guerin, 144 La. 754, 81 So. 302 (1919); and
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 1053 (1995).
142. Cassidy v. Billy M. Corp., 365 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (citing 51C CJ.S.
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least some Louisiana cases have used this term in describing contractual
arrangements relating to leases.'
A lessee typically wants an attornment agreement because then the lessee
will continue to enjoy the thing leased on the same terms provided for in the
lease agreement whether (1) the lessor sells the thing leased to a third party who
becomes the new lessor, 4 (2) the lessor defaults under a mortgage recorded
prior to the lease or extract of lease, and either the lender or another third party
comes into possession of the leased property through foreclosure or (3) the
lessor, who does not own the real property, but is actually a sublessor who
possesses the real property pursuant to a ground lease with the owner of the real
property, defaults under the ground lease and the ground lessor takes possession
of the leased property as a result of the sublessor's default. As a matter of
practice, an attornment agreement usually includes provisions on "non-distur-

Landlord and Tenant § 22 (1968)). For additional discussion ofattornment agreements, see 49 Am.
Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 940 and 1053 (1995); 54A Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages §199 and 242
(1996); 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 823 (1996); David G. Estes and Gregory B. Shean, 428
PLI/Real 343 Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, "Lenders and Leases:
Analyzing Lease Collateral Before and after Foreclosure"; Andrea Paretts Ascher and Joshua Stein,
428 PLI/Real 421 Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, May-June, 1998, "The
Lender's View of Leases: A Near and Farsighted Approach"; Joshua Stein and Andrea P. Ascher,
418 PLI/Real 297, Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, "The Logic of
Subordination, Nondisturbance and Attomment Agreements," May, 1997; Morton P. Fisher, Jr., C149
ALI-ABA 573, Modem Real Estate Transactions, "Subordination, Non-disturbance, and Attomment
Agreements," August 16, 1995; and Ronald H. Wilcomes, 363 PLI/Real 185 Real Estate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series, "Leases and Non-disturbance, Subordination and Attomment
Agreements from a Lender's Perspective," November 9, 1990.
143. In Knapp v. Guerin, 144 La. 754, 81 So. 302 (1919), the courtbriefly discussed the history
of the requirement that a tenant "attom" to a new landlord before the landlord could transfer his
property to another landlord, noted that the feudal system was abolished, and found that the
discussion of attoinment was interesting only historically, for it was not common law but rather the
principles of civil law that control transactions in Louisiana. The defendant had the legal right to
sell and the rights of the plaintiff (tenant) were not affected upon transfer of the leased property to
a new owner. In Welsh v. August, 52 La. Ann. 1949, 28 So. 363 (1900), the court, in a petitory
action about owneship of real property, noted only that the evidence showed that tenant had
"attomed" to the defendant upon his obtaining title to the property at a tax sale. Dyerv. Wilson, 190
So. 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939), involved a tax sale. The court noted that the tenant's possession
could have been disturbed by the new owner; however, the tenant was allowed to remain and the
lease was considered reconducted (citing Anderson v. Comeau, 33 La. Ann. 1119 (1881), where the
court stated that by allowing the tenant to remain on the premises after the sheriff's sale, a tacit
reconduction or "attomment"occurred). In Cassidyv. Billy M. Corp., 365 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1978), the court considered an "Attomment and Non-Disturbance Agreemene' in a declaratory
judgment suit and held that the terms of the agreement were not binding upon the owner of the
property until the sublessor defaulted under the lease, at which time the owner would become the
lessor.
144. The purchaser of the leased property from the lessor will be bound by the lease, provided
that the lease or an extract of the lease is recorded in the conveyance records of the parish where the
real property is located (La. R.S. 9:2721 (Supp. 1999)), but often attainment language is included
in the section in the lease that addresses successors and assigns of the parties.
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bance." A non-disturbance agreement provides that the lessee's peaceful
possession will not be disturbed as long as lessee is not in default of the lease.
Even if a lease is filed in the public records, a foreclosure by the lessor's lender
(on a mortgage that primes the lease) or the extinguishment of a ground
lease (where the tenant is a lessee of the sublessor) can give the third
party a basis to declare the lease extinguished and seek eviction of the
tenant. The attornment agreement protects the tenant's investment in the leased
premises and assures that the lease will continue unabated for its entire
contractual term.
No formal language is needed in an attornment agreement, and in Louisiana
these agreements typically are not recorded but remain simply agreements among
the affected parties. If a tenant requests an attornment and non-disturbance
agreement, the lender and lessor often will insist upon a subordination agreement
in exchange. The subordination agreement typically provides that the lessee
subordinates its interest in the thing leased to the lender's mortgage, as well as
to all future mortgages. Usually, in a single document the lessee and lessor enter
into a "Subordination, Non-Disturbance, and Attornment Agreement" that
combines all of these provisions. The lessor wants the agreement in order
to obtain current and future financing. The lessee wants the agreement to
protect its rights in the lease. The landlord's lender wants the agreement
so that, regardless of whether the mortgage on the lessor's property is
superior to or inferior to the lease, the lessee must comply with the lease
provisions and pay the lender the rent upon foreclosure in exchange for
the lessee remaining in possession of the leased premises while the lender
retains the option to extinguish the lease upon foreclosure. The lender
typically wants notice from both lessor and lessee of defaults of the other
party and an option (but not a requirement) to cure defaults to keep the
lease in effect.
Merely stating that "lender shall attom unto lessee" may not be self-

explanatory in Louisiana, and, because there are no statutory provisions on
these types of clauses in Louisiana, cautious practitioners will avoid

common law phrases or will, at the very least, describe in detail the rights
and obligations of each party to an attonment, subordination, and nondisturbance agreement.
IX.

CONCLUSION

While Louisiana is a civilian and not a common law state, the types of
financing typically done throughout the United States can be done in Louisiana,
although the terminology and documentation may differ somewhat from the
other forty-nine states. Louisiana statutes and jurisprudence permit the kind of
efficacious commercial financing that borrowers and lenders expect when the
security interest relates to rights of either a lessor or tenant under a lease. The
creation of the financing documents provides an opportunity for a
balancing of interests. Often, four parties are involved: the tenant, the
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landlord, and lenders who are extending credit to each. Knowledgeable counsel
who are aware of the intricacies of the Louisiana statutes, as well as the
foreclosure rules in this state (which prohibit self-help) will have the upper hand
in negotiations. 4

145. A discussion of the rules of Louisiana executory process and foreclosure is beyond the
scope of this article.

